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THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN THE CORPORATE WORLD:
AN ABDICATION OF PROFESSIONAL
SELF-REGULATION
Carl A. Pierce*
The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Respon-
sibility1 (Code or CPR) provides the foundation for the regulation
of the legal profession by the members of the profession them-
selves. Although the drafters of the CPR have described it as a
body of fundamental ethical principles applicable to all lawyers
regardless of the nature of their professional activities, 2 this article
examines the vitality of the CPR and professional self-regulation
in one particular area of lawyers' activities: corporate practice?
The article suggests that the legal profession has abdicated its
self-regulatory role, discusses the consequences of this abdication,
and advances some alternatives to remedy the failings of profes-
sional self-regulation in the area of corporate practice.
1. THE FAILURE OF THE MECHANISMS OF
SELF-REGULATION IN CORPORATE PRACTICE
Evaluating self-regulation in corporate practice entails the ex-
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1969,
J.D., 1972, Yale University. The author wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the
suggestions of Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard of Yale Law School.
I ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as CPR].
2 CPR, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. This approach, the drafters state, is necessitated by
the impossibility of foreseeing every problem that might arise in the many varieties of legal
practice. In actuality, however, the CPR does contain rules applicable to very specific
segments of legal practice, such as group legal services (DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-103(D) ),
litigation (DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-106 et. seq.), and public service activities (DISCIPLINARY
RULES 8-101, 9- 101). The Code may be analyzed better as a compendium of rules some of
which are applicable to all lawyers and some of which are designed to deal with specific
problems foreseen in conjunction with specific varieties of practice. Within this framework,
the draftsmen of the CPR chose not to articulate specific rules for the corporate counselor.
3 For the purposes of this article, the phrase corporate practice refers to the representa-
tion by attorneys of enterprises doing business in the corporate form. In this context
corporate attorneys are those attorneys who serve business corporations in a professional
capacity, whether as house counsel or as a member of a large law firm whose clients are
primarily corporations. These firms have been discussed in E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET
LAWYER (1964).
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amination of a system of social control premised on the assump-
tion that if rules are "properly defined, effectively internalized,
and actively enforced they would be faithfully observed." 4 This
system of self-regulation relies on several elements. The CPR
represents a codification of professional obligations designed to
define norms of conduct for the legal profession. 5 The ABA
Committee on Professional Ethics, in conjunction with state and
local ethics committees, implements the goals of the Code by
providing the continuing education that is deemed necessary for
the internalization by attorneys of their responsibilitiesO The final
component of the regulatory scheme is the ABA Committee on
Professional Grievances, which in conjunction with state and
local grievance committees provides for the active enforcement of
the CPR and discipline of those lawyers who deviate from its
strictures. 7 The success or failure of the system of self-regulation
in corporate practice, as well as in other varieties of practice, thus
depends in part on the clarity of the rules set forth in the CPR, the
ability of the ethics committees to impress upon the corporate bar
the meaning of their professional obligations, and the ability of the
grievance committees to discipline those attorneys who deviate
therefrom.
A. The Failings of the Disciplinary Mechanism
For the scheme of social control envisaged by the profession to
be successful, the bar must be able to discipline effectively those
corporate attorneys whose conduct deviates from the standards
set forth in the CPR. The profession's disciplinary machinery,
however, has proved inadequate for this task.8
At the heart of the disciplinary mechanism is the concept of
self-policing. Although complaints to a grievance committee may
on occasion emanate from aggrieved clients, the CPR also re-
4
J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 6 (1966).
5 The CPR replaced the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics.
The drafters of the Code felt that the Canons were out of date, did not reflect the changed
and changing conditions in the legal system and society at large, did not cover many
lawyers' activities, and were so broad and generalized that they provided neither guidance
for the lawyer nor standards by which he could be judged.6 See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1-7
(1967). Although this article will focus on the performance of the ABA Committee on
Professional Ethics, it should be remembered that most state bar associations and many
city bar associations have their own e.thics committees.7 Cf. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (final draft, 1970)
[hereinafter cited as DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT]. It again should be noted that most
state and local bar associations have their own grievance committees. Most of the dis-
ciplinary proceedings that occur are at the state and local level. Id. at 5.
BSee generally id. at 1-9.
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quires that a lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a viola-
tion of a disciplinary rule report the violation to the appropriate
grievance committee. 9 Failure to report a known violation is in
itself a violation. 10 In theory these requirements are com-
mendable, but as Professor Carlin has pointed out, "lawyers are
notoriously unwilling to lodge complaints against colleagues."'"
Several factors militate against effective self-policing. Corpo-
rate attorneys might be hesitant to file complaints because the
application of the CPR to their own practices may generate uncer-
tain results. As will be seen,' 2 it is difficult enough for an attorney
to determine his own professional obligations, much less those of
his brethren. Additionally, one might suspect that an attorney will
not report a violation of a professional norm if he himself believes
the norm to be trivial, and Professor Carlin's findings suggest that
many of the peculiarly professional rules are so regarded by most
lawyers, including those in corporate practice.' 3
The practical pressures of corporate practice further militate
against the effective policing of the corporate bar. Even if lawyers
desired to act as policemen, most simply do not have the time to
do so; the pressures of keeping their corporate clients within the
law precludes their acting in an overzealous fashion in keeping
their brethren true to the strictures of the CPR.' 4 Because many
law firms and corporate law departments are large in size, many
violations are invisible to all outside the specific organization and
probably to some of those inside as well. Even where a violation
is visible to a member of the organization, it is unlikely that he
will report it to the appropriate grievance committee as required
by Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A). Professor Smigel, in his study of
corporate lawyers, isolated "good judgment" as an essential ele-
9 DISCIPLINARY RULE I-103(A) of the CPR provides: "A lawyer possessing unprivi-
leged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or
other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation."
10CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 1-102(A) provides "A lawyer shall not violate a Dis-
ciplinary Rule." A failure to report unprivileged knowledge of a violation of a disciplinary
rule would thus violate Disciplinary Rule I- 102(A).
" J. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 153. Professor Carlin has suggested fear of retaliation,
lack of concern, and the greater effectiveness of economic sanctions as possible reasons
for the lawyer's hesitancy to bring his colleagues before a grievance committee.
The ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement has also
concluded that "[w]ith few exceptions, the prevailing, attitude of lawyers toward dis-
ciplinary enforcement ranges from apathy to outright hostility." DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT, supra note 7, at 1.
12 See part I C infra.
13 J. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 49-52, 155. Professor Carlin terms such rules "paper
norms" and demonstrates that the corporate bar does not regard as salient some of the
profession's rules against solicitation and the representation of conflicting interests.
14 If one needs convincing, see, e.g., Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession:
An Answer to Critics of the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A.J. 89, 91 (1949), for a discussion of the
pace ajid pressure of corporate practice.
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ment in the organizational success of Wall Street law firms. 15 It is
doubtful that "good judgment" would include reporting a sus-
pected violation by a partner or an associate of one's own firm to
the grievance committee.
In addition to these practical factors, the disciplinary mecha-
nism may be undermined by an informal "professional value" akin
to that discerned by Professor Smigel in his study of Wall Street
lawyers. Most of the lawyers in Professor Smigel's sample consid-
ered it improper to criticize the work of other lawyers or to gossip
about them. In fact Smigel encountered difficulty in persuading
the corporate bar to discuss their activities at all, much less their
ethical problems. 16 This rule of professional etiquette is reinforced
by very practical considerations: the risks of the bitterness and
retaliation that reporting a violation would provoke. In view of
these realities, it is likely that unless an attorney or his client has
been seriously injured by the misdeed of another, the violation
will go unreported. Thus, it is conceivable that many violations of
the CPR by corporate practitioners will never come to the atten-
tion of the bar association at all.
These considerations support the conclusion that there is little,
if any, actual self-policing within the corporate bar. The absence
of self-policing indicates that, as elsewhere in the profession,
nonenforcement of the CPR constitutes the norm.' 7 Thus the
deterrent effect of disciplinary proceedings is dissipated. 18 When
the sanction of reporting a violation of the CPR to the bar associ-
ation is so rarely used against unethical lawyers, 9 one cannot
help feeling that the disciplinary machinery exists more for win-
15 E. SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 260-62.
16 Id. at 17- 21, 266.
17 Professor Kaplan, in discussing the penalties for representing conflicting interests in
corporate practice, concludes: "I don't really see severe discipline as a very likely thing."
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATIONS,
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN CORPORATE LAW PRACTICE 247 (1971) (remarks of Professor
Kaplan) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]. See also J. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 150-67; E.
SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 271.
18 J. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 161. But see, E.. SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 272; Kaplan,
supra note 17, at 247. Professor Smigel "presumes" that the threat of punishment, albeit
slight, serves as a deterrent to antisocial behavior. Professor Kaplan thinks that any
possible embarrassment due to bar discipline will incline corporate lawyers to consider
their responsibilities carefully. Because adverse publicity lies at the foundation of the
deterrent effect envisaged by Professors Smigel and Kaplan, Professor Carlin's finding that
little publicity is accorded to most disciplinary proceedings weakens their argument. J.
CARLIN, supra note 4, at 161. This author finds more persuasive Carlin's conclusion that
the deterrent effect is minimal.
1
aJ. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 161-62, 163 n.9. Most lawyers, Professor Carlin reports,
would actually use economic sanctions, such as terminating referrals, against the unethical.
These sanctions, however effective they may be as a deterrent, are not part of the formal
self-regulatory scheme of the CPR.
WINTER 19731
Journal of Law Reform
dow dressing than for the effective scrutiny of the professionalism
of the bar.2
B. The Failings of the Educational Mechanism
In addition to discipline, the self-regulatory system of the pro-
fession relies on the continuing education of attorneys concerning
their responsibilities. The educational mechanism relied upon by
the drafters of the CPR, however, proves to be as inadequate as
the disciplinary mechanisms.
The opinions of the Ethics Committee at best provide a meager
source of ethical elucidation. There are very few opinions apply-
ing the Canons expressly to corporate practice? 1 No doubt this
paucity of opinions stems from the fact that requests from corpo-
rate practitioners for opinions are few. The lack of requests for
opinions may arise because some ethical problems of the prac-
titioner may simply be ignored; many may not be recognized as
ethical problems at all; others may be resolved to the satisfaction
of the individual lawyer involved, so that he would not see any
need for the assistance of the Ethics Committee. The corporate
attorney is just as unlikely to seek ethical advice from the Ethics
Committee as he is to turn to the Practicing Law Institute for
technical advice or to the economics committee of the state bar
association for advice about running his firm. It is often the case
that the needs of a client for immediate advice or action may
preclude formal inquiry of the Ethics Committee before the ad-
vice is rendered or the action taken. When corporate counsel is
under such pressure to provide the correct legal answer, it is not
surprising that he does not find time to search out the correct
ethical solution. Nor is it surprising that after having acted, the
attorney might be hesitant to solicit an opinion to the effect that
he had acted improperly.
Much of the difficulty with the educational mechanism may be
attributed to the Ethics Committee. It regards its function as only
advisory in nature,22 and, as a result, many of the opinions from
20 Id. at 161.
21 Of the 330 Formal Opinions rendered by the A.BA Committee of Professional Ethics,
only six appear to be related to corporate practice. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA FORMAL
OPINIONS]. Of the approximately one thousand informal opinions only twenty, or 2
percent, appear to have arisen from corporate practice. See ABA COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA INFORMAL OPIN-
IONS].
22 The function of the Ethics Committee is "primarily to formulate opinions of general
application, or to render advisory opinions where a lawyer is in doubt as to whether or not
[VOL. 6:350
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the Committee are equivocal -painting broad parameters and
leaving the final resolution of the problem to the individual prac-
titioner. 23 It has also been loath to upset the existing order. 24
Rather than suggest the ethical impropriety of a prevalent prac-
tice, the Committee will base its decision on corporate theory that
may not reflect accurately the reality confronting the corporate
lawyer.25 Furthermore many of the opinions involve relatively
unimportant questions of professional etiquette. 26 Ultimately,
however, the failure of the Ethics Committee results from its
unwillingness to take the initiative and to issue opinions consid-
ering difficult, frequently recurring problems of corporate practice
about which it has not been asked? 7 The small number of opin-
ions dealing with corporate practice indicates that complete re-
contemplated action would be ethical." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IN-
FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 649 (1963). The Ethics Committee designates as formal opinions
those interpretations of the Canons which it believes to be of broad, general interest.
Informal opinions are responses to questions that are comparatively narrow in scope and
arise infrequently. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 21, at 6.
The advisory function of the Ethics Committee may be contrasted with the decisional
function of a court. When parties to a dispute properly present a question to a court, it
must decide unequivocably in favor of one position or another. In contrast, the Ethics
Committee may leave the resolution to the parties before it.
23 See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1056
(1968), discussed in notes 25 and 40 infra.24 When the Committee addressed the question of the professional propriety of an
attorney's sitting on the board of directors of a client corporation, for example, it approved
the practice in part because it was commonplace at the time. ABA COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 930 (1966). The same approach was adopted
when the propriety of an attorney's owning stock in a client corporation was questioned.
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1056 (1968). Ideally,
one might hope that the Committee would at least lead rather than follow in the delineation
of standards of professional conduct.
25 The Ethics Committee also justified the practice of an attorney's serving as a director
of a client corporation on the theory that there is no inherent conflict of interest between
the directors of a corporation and the corporation itself. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 930 (1966). This theory, of course, overlooks the
inevitable conflict of interest over legal fees and the reality that "anytime a lawyer advises
a corporation to do something that might embarrass or cast aspersions on the board, he is
going to think twice about it if he is a member of that board." Gardner, A Question for Mr.
Casey, Wall St. J., March 3, 197 1, at 16, col. 3. When the real conflicts do arise, the Ethics
Committee typically offers little assistance.
Similarly the Committee permits an attorney to purchase-or accept as a fee-stock of a
client corporation on the theory that "what is in the best interests of the corporation
furthers his interests as a stockholder." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IN-
FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1056 (1968). Again, reality belies the simplicity of this conception
and reveals conflicts between shareholder interests and the corporate interest. See, e.g.,
Mundheim, Representing the Acquired Company in Merger Negotiations: Some Problems
of Professional Responsibility, 10 CORP. PRACTICE COMMENTATOR 217, 22 I 22 (1968).2
zSee, e.g., ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 285
(1951), for a discussion of the propriety of a law firm's being listed as general counsel on a
corporation's letterhead and in reports to stockholders.27 The Ethics Committee has authority not only to express its opinion when consulted
by an attorney, but also to "[flormulate and recommend standards of ethics and conduct in
the practice of law as a profession." ABA FORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 21, at 3. If the
extent of this authority is not clear, it should be made so.
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liance upon formal inquiries will not provide sufficient opportu-
nities for the Ethics Committee to fulfill its function of continuing
education of the corporate bar about its professional responsi-
bilities. Absent a change in the activities of the Ethics Committee
the educational input that is necessary for the success of the
profession's self-regulatory system will not be forthcoming.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
If one discounts the value of both the disciplinary and educa-
tional mechanisms relied upon by the drafters of the CPR, he
might conclude that the effect of the CPR upon the corporate bar,
if any, will not be realized through external indoctrination and
enforcement. Rather, for the Code to be effective, each attorney
must achieve both a self-initiated awareness of his obligations
under the Code and a recognition of a duty of compliance. Yet to
have even this limited, although by no means insignificant, effect,
the CPR must be functionalized in the corporate setting: it must
address the nuances of corporate practice. An analysis of the
CPR, however, indicates that the drafters did not succeed in
clarifying the professional obligations of the corporate lawyer.
Rather they left him with extensive individual discretion in the
conduct of his professional activities.
In their quest for rules applicable to all lawyers regardless of
the nature of their practice, the drafters of the CPR followed the
general approach of the Canons, which defined the attorney's
obligations in terms of a simplistic notion of the attorney-client
relationship as a one-to-one interaction between a solo prac-
titioner and an individual client.28 In order to fit the corporate
client into this mold, the drafters then provided in Ethical Consid-
eration 5-18 that
[a] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar
entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stock-
28The major sections of the CPR that involve the attorney-client relationship are
Canons 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Canon 4 provides: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."
Canon 5 provides: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client." Canon 6 provides: "A lawyer should represent a client competently." Canon 7
provides: "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
The Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers." CPR, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
Each Canon is followed by Ethical Considerations, which "are aspirational in character
and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive"
and Disciplinary Rules, which "state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
[VOL. 6:350
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holder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other
person connected with the entity. In advising the entity, a
lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his profes-
sional judgment should not be influenced by the personal
desires of any person or organization.
This statement contains a preliminary recognition of the
artificial nature of the corporation. It was, of course, designed to
provide a framework for the application of those disciplinary
rules which do not take account of the special problems present-
ed when the client is a corporation rather than an individual.2 9
Not all of the disciplinary rules of the CPR are particularly
relevant to the attorney-client relationship in the corporate set-
ting. In contrast, some of the disciplinary rules are specifically
designed for corporate practice.3 0 However, many disciplinary
rules, especially those dealing with client confidences3 1 and
conflicting interests,3 2 are particularly troublesome. The vitality of
29 The Preliminary Statement to the CPR indicates that an enforcing agency "may find
interpretive guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the objectives
reflected in the Ethical Considerations." CPR, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
30 For example, a lawyer may be designated as an attorney in routine reports and
announcements of a corporation for which he is a director. CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE
2-101(A)(3). Similarly, the general counsel of a corporation may be specified as such on
stationery of the corporation if he devotes a substantial amount of professional time to the
representation of that client. CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-102(A)(4).
31 CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101 (B) provides:
Except when permitted by DR 4- 10 I(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or
of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101(C) provides in part:
A lawyer may reveal:
(I) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected,
but only after a full disclosure to them....
3 2 CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 5-10 1 (A) provides:
Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of
his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, busi-
ness, property, or personal interests.
CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 5-105 provides in part:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, except
to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except to the
extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may
represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure
of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment on behalf of each.
Journal of Law Reform
these rules as norms of professional conduct depends on the
concepts set forth in Ethical Consideration 5-18, and, unfortu-
nately, Ethical Consideration 5-18 does not serve the purpose
envisaged by its drafters.
A. Representation of Conflicting Interests:
A Lack of Guidance for the Corporate Counselor
When tested in corporate practice, those rules of the CPR
dealing with the maintenance of independent professional judg-
ment offer an example of the inadequacy of Ethical Consideration
5-18 as a source of guidance for the attorney seeking to ascertain
his professional responsibilities. If an attorney's professional judg-
ment on behalf of a client's interests "will or reasonably may be
affected" by his own financial, business, or personal interests, or
those of another client, he must not accept or must withdraw from
representation unless there has been full disclosure of the circum-
stances and consent by the client.33 If an attorney must withdraw,
his partners also may not accept the employment. 34 Under Ethical
Consideration 5-18, the client is the corporate entity itself, and
the corporate lawyer must determine the propriety of his repre-
sentation by reference to the interests of the entity, not those of
any groups connected with the entity, such as directors, officers,
or stockholders.
The apparent simplicity of these principles is misleading be-
cause the corporate interest-i.e., the interest of the client-can
be determined only by the balancing of the many, often divergent
interests of those persons who have legal interests in the corpo-
ration.35 As different persons or groups within the corporation
have differing concepts of the corporate interest, so also the
power to speak and act for the corporation may be located in
different persons or groups within the corporation. Furthermore
this locus of power is always subject to change. Ethical Consid-
eration 5-18 may be an adequate guideline for the attorney when
33 CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 5-105.3 4 CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 5-105(D). One should note that the proscription of Dis-
ciplinary Rule 5-105(D) applies only to those situations where an attorney's independent
judgment is impaired by the interests of another client. It does not appear to apply where
an attorney's independent judgment is impaired by his own financial, business, property or
personal interests. For a discussion of intrafirm conflicts of interest under the Canons, see
Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm
Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1963).
35 These could include the interests of directors, officers, bondholders, preferred stock-
holders, common stockholders, potential investors, employees, suppliers, consumers, and
even the federal government.
[VOL. 6:350
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all interested parties agree about the corporate interest, or when
there is only one group or individual having any legal interest in
the corporation. Unfortunately those situations are quite rare.
1. Representation of Conflicting Interests-Two common situ-
ations reflect the inadequacy of Ethical Consideration 5-18 in
situations involving potential conflicts among those legally in-
terested in the corporation. Consider, for instance, the propriety
of an attorney's representing both a parent corporation and its
subsidiary in a transaction between the two. Both the parent
corporation and the subsidiary corporations are separate legal
entities within the meaning of Ethical Consideration 5-18. If there
is a "substantial identity of underlying ownership" of both the
parent and the subsidiary, the profession will pierce the corporate
veil and treat the corporations as one client for purposes of
applying the CPRP8 If the parent does not own all the stock of
the subsidiary, however, conflicts of interest may arise between
the parent corporation and the minority ownership interests of the
subsidiary.3 7 Because there is typically an overlap of management
in parent-subsidiary relationships, it is not surprising that, in order
to reduce legal expenses, management of both corporations might
seek the assistance of one attorney in structuring a transaction
between the two corporations rather than retaining two attorneys,
one for each corporation. The Ethics Committee has permitted an
attorney to represent both corporations, provided that (1) the dual
representation will not affect the exercise of the attorney's inde-
pendent judgment, (2) it is obvious to the attorney that he can
adequately represent the interest of each corporation, and (3) each
corporation consents to the representation after full disclosure.38
One must question the vitality of the profession's standard for
determining the permissibility of such dual representation. The
Ethics Committee could have simply barred dual representation
where a minority interest existed in the subsidiary corporation.
36 ABA COMM. OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 973 (1967).
Substantial identity of underlying ownership is deemed to exist where the subsidiary is
wholly owned by the parent or where the stock of both the parent and the subsidiary is
owned "by substantially the same shareholders in substantially the same proportions." The
pregnant phrase "substantially the same" is left undefined and seems to leave open the
possibility of dual representation of a parent and subsidiary where minority interests are
present.3 7 See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd
in pari, 458 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir. 1972), involving a merger between a parent and a partially
owned subsidiary. An action brought by minority shareholders under SEC Rule l0b-5
alleged a failure to disclose that the same law firm advised both the parent and the
subsidiary. For a discussion of Kohn from the standpoint of professional responsibility, see
Kaplan, supra note 17, at 240-47.
38CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 5-105(A); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, IN-
FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 973 (1967).
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Rather it chose to permit each attorney to decide the question for
himself. Unfortunately, the Committee has provided no mean-
ingful standards to assist the attorney in deciding the issue. The
attorney must resolve two questions: whether his independent
judgment will be affected and whether he can adequately repre-
sent the interest of each corporation. Independence of judgment
is, of course, a nebulous concept at best and accords the attorney
great leeway. As concerns the second question, it should be clear
that the corporate interest in any given situation is invariably the
subject of dispute. Because the Ethics Committee did not ex-
pound upon the meaning of independent judgment or undertake a
definition of the corporate interest, the attorney is left entirely to
his own judgment. Even the requirement of client consent is
illusory in this setting, for the very individuals who requested dual
representation in the first place are those empowered to consent
for both corporations. 3 9
2. The Practitioner, the Corporation, and the Corporate In-
terest-The difficulties in applying the principles of Ethical Con-
sideration 5-18 are equally pronounced when only one corpo-
ration is involved. In a recent request for an opinion a corporate
counselor inquired whether it would be proper for him to advise
the president of his corporate client as to a method of conducting
the election of directors whereby the incumbent promanagement
slate could outpoll a minority slate and thus prevent the minority
stockholders from gaining a seat on the board of directors. The
Ethics Committee responded that the attorney might do so as long
as he sincerely believed his advice was legally sound and "not
contrary to the interests of the corporation itself."40 Because the
corporation may act only through its officers and directors, the
Committee reasoned, the attorney should give these agents legal
advice in all matters relating to the corporation (presumably
39Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Kaplan, supra note 17, at 242.4 0 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1056 (1968).
Compare Informal Opinion No. 1056 with ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 86 (1932). In Formal Opinion No. 86, the Ethics Committee
considered the propriety of a corporation's general counsel's soliciting, by means of
personal interviews and letters, proxies from stockholders. The Committee ruled that such
solicitation was improper and stated most broadly that "in acting as the corporation's legal
advisor [the general counsel] must refrain from taking part in any controversies or factional
differences which may exist among stockholders as to its control." Although Formal
Opinion No. 86 can be construed to prohibit a corporate attorney from any participation in
a battle for control of his client corporation, Informal Opinion No 1056 construed the
earlier opinion very narrowly and emphasized the impermissible manner of participation in
the proxy fight (the personal solicitation of proxies) rather than the mere fact of participa-
tion. See also ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 516
(1962).
[VOL. 6:350
CPR in the Corporate World
including matters such as tenure, in which management has a
personal interest as well), "except in situations where to his
knowledge the interests of the officers are adverse to the interests
of the corporation and the giving of advice would be contrary to
the interest of the corporation." Note, however, that the Ethics
Committee did not determine whether the electoral manipula-
tion involved was contrary to the corporate interest. Instead it
left that determination to the individual attorney, without the
slightest hint as to the proper resolution of the question. In-
asmuch as these questions only arise when the corporate interest
is in dispute, the attorney is given unbridled discretion and no
meaningful guidance in what the Ethics Committee called a
"very difficult and delicate position."
In one sense, the drafters of the CPR have neglected to define
the "client" of the corporate practitioner. 41 Ethical Consideration
5-18 tells the practitioner that his client is an abstract legal entity,
whereas in reality he must provide services for different persons
and groups, all of whom arguably embody his "client" but who
may have conflicting interests among themselves in that regard.
Whenever conflicts arise, the attorney is forced to ask anew,
"who is the corporation?" After all, he is dealing with real people,
as well as legal concepts. As the corporate attorney defines his
client, he simultaneously defines his professional obligations. He
necessarily does so completely on his own because the CPR
speaks of professional obligations only with reference to an as-
certainable client, which begs the question if the attorney has
complete discretion in determining, who, among many possible
candidates, shall be deemed to embody the corporation.
Viewed slightly differently, the requirement of Ethical Consid-
eration 5-18 that the attorney act with reference to some un-
defined concept of the "corporate interest" places the corporate
lawyer in a position similar to that of the "public interest" lawyer.
Although there are many lawyers who criticize the latter for
predetermining the public interest, the profession requires, as an
attribute of ethicality, that the corporate attorney predetermine
the corporate interest, a concept at least as vague and as subject
to dispute as the public interest. Because "corporate interest,"
like "public interest," is not embodied in an objective standard,
but must be defined with reference to the desires of the in-
41 Hazard, Expanding Responsibilities Under the Securities Acts, 156 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. A- I, A-2 (June 14, 1972). For a similar criticism of the Canons see the comments of
Judge Carl McGowan, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, CONFERENCE ON
CONFLICT OF INTEREST (Conference Series No. 17, 1961), cited in Kaplan, supra note 17,
at 234-35.
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dividuals and groups who are constantly seeking to further their
personal versions of the "corporate interest," Ethical Consid-
eration 5-18 essentially requires the corporate lawyer to resolve
the merits of a conflict while the matter is pending and to repre-
sent only those persons, if any, who agree with his concept of the
corporate interest. Instructing the attorney to represent the corpo-
rate interest only raises the essential question, "What is the cor-
porate interest?" Both the CPR and the Ethics Committee have
left that question unanswered.
By leaving the determination of the corporate interest to each
individual attorney, the CPR and the Ethics Committee in es-
sence require the corporate lawyer to be "counsel for the situ-
ation," a role that stands in sharp contrast to the traditionally
accepted role of the lawyer as an advocate for or counsel to only
one interest at a time.42 For the corporate practitioner to deter-
mine which interest to advocate he must in reality act as a media-
tor of potentially conflicting interests of directors, officers, share-
holders, and even potential investors. He must consider the in-
terests of all parties affected by the corporate action rather than
the interest of just one party. The attorney must, therefore, deter-
mine his professional responsibilities as counsel for the situation.
Only after determining the corporate interest in this manner can
the corporate attorney commence the traditional role of advocate.
Inasmuch as the CPR does not acknowledge the possibility of an
attorney's serving as counsel for the situation, it provides no
standards for the corporate attorney who is required by Ethical
Consideration 5-18 to serve in that role.
B.The Silence of the CPR
Not only does the CPR fail to provide objective standards of
conduct, but its emphasis on the corporate entity, as opposed to
the individuals who make it a functioning organization, leaves
unaddressed many of the foreseeable ethical problems of the
corporate bar. It fails to provide guidance as to what are the
4 2 The phrase "counsel for the situation" was coined by Justice Brandeis when, during
the Senate fight over his confirmation as a Justice of the Supreme Court, he was charged
with having represented conflicting interests. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D.
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. Rt-v. 683, 702 (1965). "Counsel for the situation" handles a
transaction and considers the interests of all parties to the transaction rather than the
interest of only one party. He acts as a neutral resource person and aids all parties to reach
an acceptable consummation of the transaction or resolution of the issues in dispute. He
acts not as an advocate, but rather as a mediator. Kaplan, supra note 17, at 236.
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corporate lawyer's obligations to potential investors,43  to the
shareholders who indirectly pay his salary or retainer,44 and to the
board of directors vis-.-vis his obligations to the executive
officers.45 The lawyer must, of course, preserve the corporation's
confidences, but the CPR does not delineate any duty to preserve
the confidences of the executives he works with-confidences
within the corporation.
The CPR requires consent of the corporation before an attor-
ney may accept or continue employment in situations in which his
interests or those of other clients may affect his professional
judgment. A serious problem is raised because attorneys are not
informed as to whose consent will suffice. 46 Ethical Consideration
4 The complaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., February 3, 1972)
has brought this particular question to the forefront. See Green, Irate Attorneys-A Bid to
Hold Lawyers Accountable to Public Stuns, Angers Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1972, at I,
col. I; Karmel, Attorney's Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1972).
Although the gravamen of part of the complaint is the failure of the law firms involved to
disclose an impending fraud to the SEC, the SEC may be regarded as the protector of the
investing public. Potential investors have an interest in the corporation under the securities
laws, and consequently attorneys must balance their interests with those of existing
shareholders, officers, and directors. In this instance, the SEC has sought to weigh the
balance in favor of the potential investor's interest in the corporation.
Alternatively, of course, one can parallel the attorney's duty to report frauds to the SEC
to his duty to report frauds to the courts. See, CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-102(b)(1). See
Karmel, supra, at 1160-62; Hazard, supra note 41, at A-I, A-2; Kaplan, supra note 17, at
256 (remarks of SEC Commissioner Loomis). An attorney for a corporation subject to
SEC regulation might be regarded as an officer of the SEC as well as an officer of the
court.
The corporate bar has expressed great concern about the National Student Marketing
case. Unfortunately, one must suspect that the concern is not so much about the ethical
posture of the corporate attorney, but rather about his potential civil liabilities under the
securities laws. ABA INFORMAL OPINION No. 1056, supra note 25, simply did not com-
mand the same audience as did the complaint in National Student Marketing, which has
been described as "the best read document since 'Gone With the Wind.' " Green, supra, at
1, col. 1. The SEC apparently has the means available to encourage corporate attorneys to
consider their professional responsibilities and perhaps should be encouraged in its efforts.
44 Many attorneys believe that they have some obligation to the shareholders, but this
responsibility has remained undefined. See McDaniel, Ethical Problems of Counsel for Big
Business: The Burden of Resolving Conflicting Interests, 38 A.B.A.J. 205, 208 (1952);
Symposium, Business Planning and Professional Responsibility 8 PRAC. LAW., Feb.,
1962, at 48; Ballard, Mundheim, Weinstock & Wetzel, The Corporate Conscience and the
Corporate Bar, 26 Bus. LAW. 959, 966-67 (197 1).
INFORMAL OPINION No. 1056, supra note 25, provides an excellent example of how the
emphasis of the CPR on the corporate entity enables the Ethics Committee to avoid
discussing the attorney's obligations to the shareholders.
4See H. KOONTZ, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 74
(1967), for the view that the directors should be aware of a division of the attorney's
loyalties between them and the operating executives. This could be especially serious
when there are "outside directors" sitting on the board, and the executive officers and the
directors disagree over a particular course of action to be followed. Conflicts may also
develop among the directors or among the officers, but the CPR is equally silent about the
attorney's obligation in the face of such internecine disputes.
46CPR, DISCIPLINARY RULES 5-101(A), 5-105. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETH-
ICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 181 (1938) suggested that consent of the shareholders is
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7-5 permits an attorney to continue to assist a client who has not
followed his advice, but it is not clear whether he may continue to
do so if a top-level executive desires to suppress an ugly situation,
or if a middle-echelon executive insists on pursuing a course of
conduct that will bring the corporation into conflict with the law.
With the advent and growth of the corporate law department,
differences have arisen among lawyers about the proper relation-
ship between house counsel, retained counsel, and the corporate
executives. 47 Yet even in this area of professional etiquette (to
which the bar has always assiduously directed its attention) the
CPR is silent.
C The Ignored Realities of Modern Corporate Practice
Ultimately, the inadequacy of the CPR in corporate practice is
a result of the failure of its drafters to address the changed
conditions of modern legal practice. While the hypothetical attor-
ney addressed by the CPR is a solo practitioner, the modern
corporate attorney is a member of what Professor Smigel terms a
professional bureaucracy-a loose hierarchy of professional col-
leagues ranging from the most senior partner to the youngest
associate. 48 Many lawyers in a corporate firm are salaried employ-
ees of the firm, having obligations to the partners as well as to
clients. Responsibility-that essential aspect of the professional
self-image- is unequally shared, and therefore the attorneys of the
large law firms are not the professional equals envisaged by the
CPR.4 9 Indeed the firm takes on an existence separate from that
of the individual attorneys who are members at any given time.
As a result both partners and associates must think of the firm as
well as of themselves.
This bureaucratic nature of the modern "attorney" is paral-
leled by that of his "client"-a large, often decentralized, often
necessary, but it was overruled by ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL
OPINION No. 271 (1946) without further discussion of the consent requirement. Ethics
Opinion No. 842 of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, however, holds
that the consent provisions are inapplicable whenever directors or officers of the corpo-
ration are involved in the conflict. 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 80 (1960). See also Kaplan,
supra note 17, at 242-47, for a discussion of consent by independent directors.
47 See, e.g., Seamans, Relations Between Corporate Legal Departments and Outside
Counsel, 15 Bus. LAW. 633 (1960).
48 E. SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 277-86.
49 Because it regards all attorneys as professional equals, the CPR does not address the
obligations of the associate in a large law firm who disagrees with a partner over the
ethicality of a proposed course of conduct. May he ethically defer to the partner's
judgment or must he do otherwise? If the latter, what course of action must he follow? In
this situation, not unlike that of a soldier who must decide whether to obey orders of
questionable legality, the associate is left without guidance.
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multi-national organization. The simplest organizational chart be-
trays the complexity of the corporate attorney's client.50 Own-
ership is significantly separated from the management of the cor-
poration5 1 The board of directors, which is responsible for the
supervision of corporate affairs, is composed of a conglomerate of
persons representing different legal interests in the corporation:
executives, major shareholders, commercial bankers, investment
bankers, major suppliers, major purchasers, the corporation's law
firm, and perhaps in the future labor, public consumers, and the
government. The corporation's operations are decentralized both
functionally- i.e., sales, purchasing, engineering, development,
public relations, etc.-and geographically, both nationally and in-
ternationally, the latter phenomenon being well demonstrated by
the growth of the conglomerates in the 1960s. Authority and
responsibility are typically diffused throughout the organization,
both for the initiation and approval of actions that bring the
corporation in contact with the law.5 2 Its business affairs are so
entwined with legal considerations that it is often difficult to
separate the two, and the latter are so ever-present that the
corporate client, unlike the client of the CPR, often has its own
law department, a professional bureaucracy within the corporate
bureaucracy.5 3
Once the attorney-client relationship is created, unchartable
patterns of power, authority, prestige, and responsibility arise
from and influence the law firm, the law department, and the
corporation itself. These professional and corporate bureaucracies
come into contact at all different levels: various members of a law
firm may deal with directors of the corporation, executives at all
levels, general counsel, and various members of the law depart-
ment.5 4 Attorneys in the law department of the corporation face
5 0 Cf. R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 49 (1945).
51 Cf. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1968).
52 The decentraliziation of the modern corporation is well demonstrated in R. GORDON,
BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION (1945). The author points out the
various functions of the board, the chief executives, and the middle-level executives who
speak for the corporation, but admits that no schematization may adequately describe the
great variety of authority patterns that exist in the modern corporation.
53 The law department often is a strict hierarchy of attorneys ranging from the general
counsel (who is often a vice president and perhaps a'director) down to staff attorneys. It is
usually organized horizontally into subdisciplines of law and sometimes decentralized
regionally in a fashion similar to the corporation itself. Although the hierarchy of the law
department is more pyramidal than the large law firm, the two are not dissimilar. As is the
case with the attorney in a firm, the attorney employed by the corporation is not the
hypothetical attorney of the CPR. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND
THEIR WORK 199-242 (1967); Creighton, Corporate Law Departments Adjust to Corpo-
rate Decentralization, 16 Bus. LAW. 1004 (1961).
54 The extent of "client" contact increases with the seniority of the attorney. Beginning
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the same variety of professional contacts. Indeed the law firm and
law department have as many clients as there are directors,
officers, department heads, employees, or any groups thereof who
seek legal advice. 55
These patterns become even more complex when one considers
that the variety of legal interests within the corporation often
conflict and that directors do not always agree among themselves,
with executives, or with shareholders. The attorney is often in the
center of this conflict, serving in his professional capacity. His
involvement may be further complicated if he is a director or a
stockholder of the corporation as well as its lawyer. As indicated
above, the profession permits the attorney to occupy these dual
roles on the theory that no conflicts of interest are involved. 56
Regardless of this theoretical lack of conflict, the attorney
practicing in such a milieu is constantly subjected to pressures
and influences, many of which may be in conflict. The conduct of
a modern corporation necessarily involves a constant reconcilia-
tion of the many differing legal interests of those people who
comprise the corporation: potential investors, common share-
holders, preferred shareholders, bondholders, customers, execu-
tives, employees, and directors. Professor Smigel indicates gener-
ally the social pressures of a professional bureaucracy and notes
the "special role of the client" in influencing the conduct of the
corporate bar.5 7 Professors Johnstone and Hopson suggest that
middle- and lower-echelon executives sometimes attempt to
influence their attorney's professional judgment, 58 and Professor
Gordon delineates the many influence groups, including the attor-
neys, that affect the decision-making process in a large corpo-
ration. 59 As Glen McDaniel, a one-time Wall Street lawyer, has
indicated, the reconciliation of conflicting interests in a corporate
"client" presents numerous opportunities and pressures to violate
professional norms. 60 These opportunities, temptations, and pres-
associates, Professor Smigel reports, do not often meet alone with principal clients, but
they do deal with subordinates of the client and quite often join partners at client
conferences. E. SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 144. Senior associates report substantial client
contact such as conferring with and advising corporate officials. Id. at 155-56. Partnership
brings with it extensive client contact and responsibility. id. at 156-60.
55 Grahame, What is Expected of a Corporate Law Department?, 49 A.B.A.J. 159
(1963).
56 ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 930 (1966); ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1056 (1968).
57 E. SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 262.58 Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 53, at 205.
59 R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION (1945).
60 McDaniel, supra note 44. While indicating situations that present difficulties for the
corporate lawyers, Mr. McDaniel concludes that corporate representation presents fewer
temptations, opportunities, and pressures to violate professional norms than other varieties
of practice. See also J. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 66-83. Edward Bloustein disagrees. From
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sures for the violation of professional standards have not been
adequately analyzed and at present their precise definition is
impossible.61 The bar, however, needs to recognize that the social
setting of corporate practice confronts the lawyer with many
challenges, varying in subtlety and social visibility, to his profes-
sional standing. A better understanding of the social setting may
aid the profession in remedying the weaknesses of the CPR or at
least further its awareness of the problems confronting profes-
sional self-regulation in corporate practice.
his experience in corporate practice, he feels that the temptations, opportunities, and
pressures are significant. "the only difference being in the degree of subtlety and social
visibility of the 'pressures' involved." Bloustein, "Lawyers' Ethics"-A Review, 22
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 479, 482 (1967).
61 Sociologists have suggested the use of status and role set theory to penetrate the
complexity of such interpersonal relationships and to isolate some of the conflicts, pres-
sures, and influences which may affect a person's decisions and actions. They attempt to
delineate the positions occupied by a given person at a given time (statuses), the persons
with whom he comes into contact as an occupant of that position (role partners), and the
conflicts which may arise. Cf. R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
(1957). For an application of this theory to broker-dealer relationships, see Levin & Evan,
Professionalism and the Stockbroker, 21 Bus. LAW. 337 (1966).
Analyzing the corporate attorney-corporate client relationship with regard to status and
role set theory, one might note that the drafters of the CPR envisage the attorney as
occupying just one status-that of attorney. Yet in corporate practice, the attorney often
occupies more than one status. In many law firms and legal departments, attorneys may be
classified as employees as well as attorneys. Additionally, the nature of the modern
corporation makes available several other statuses that an attorney might occupy or with
which he might interact: potential investor, stockholder, director, officer, employee.
Status conflict results when the interests and obligations of two statuses differ and is
most acute when the same individual occupies conflicting statuses. Id. at 342. Because
attorneys often occupy multiple statuses, the profession needs to analyze empirically the
interests and obligations of each possible status and the conflicts (no matter how subtle)
that might arise.
In any status, a person interacts with role partners; for example, a partner of a law firm
may deal with other partners, associates, directors, stockholders, executives of varying
rank, and other attorneys. A person's role partners comprise his role set; any status has a
unique set of role partners. Id. at 340. Persons in different statuses, however, may interact
with the same role partner; for example, a director and an officer (two separate statuses)
may both interact with a corporate attorney. Different statuses may also have overlapping
role sets.
Role conflict results when a person's obligations to one role partner are incompatible
with his obligations to another. Id. at 343. Conflicts may arise due to the rank, prestige, or
influence of role partners and the effect different role partners can have on the interests of
the status occupant. For example, the role partner (whether it be an executive, a director,
or a group thereof) who retained the services of an attorney and has the power to terminate
the relationship may have greater influence with the attorney than a role partner who does
not have such power. To understand the social setting in which the CPR applies, the
profession must seek to delineate an attorney's role partners, the conflicts that arise, and
the influences that affect the resolution of the role conflicts.
Status and role set theory provides a framework for an empirical study of the corporate
law firm-corporate client relationship. Of course, any such study. may be opposed by the
profession as violative of the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. Without
such an empirical foundation, however, it will be difficult for the bar to draw any mean-
ingful conclusions about the social setting of corporate practice and its impact on the
vitality of professional self-regulation.
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III. THE CODE AND SELF-REGULATION OF THE
CORPORATE BAR: SOME CONSEQUENCES
Given the failure of the CPR to address so many aspects of
professional conduct in corporate practice and the inadequacy of
the standards set forth, the corporate lawyer is left without official
guidance. The profession has abdicated its self-assumed and jeal-
ously guarded role of self-regulator. This abdication is particularly
significant in the corporate arena, where the interaction between
the lawyers and the corporation is so complex, and the societal
stakes so large. As public concern about corporate conduct in-
creases and is translated into law, the needs of the corporation for
legal assistance will increase; and as the patterns of relationships
among the attorneys in law firms, the attorneys in law depart-
ments, and the executives of the corporation enlarge, the in-
dividual attorney may find it increasingly arduous to balance his
obligations in a manner consistent with the expectations of the
profession. Before the attorney can even attempt to resolve his
dilemma, he must face the more difficult task of perceiving dis-
tinctly what the conflicts are. Lacking any external guidance, his
conscience will be his only guide.
What evidence we have, albeit slight, indicates that Abe Po-
merantz, the dean of plaintiff's bar, may be correct when he
states that conscience is a weak reed on which to rely. 62 Although
Professor Carlin concluded that the incidence of deviation from
professional standards is lower among corporate lawyers than
among lower status practitioners, little comfort can be found in
the fact that only 35 percent of the "elite" attorneys surveyed
disapproved of representing one of two previously represented
business partners against the other without the consent of the
other in an action to dissolve the business, a course of conduct
involving potential conflicts of interest and breaches of con-
fidence. 63 Without intending to characterize the corporate bar as a
community of sinners, one also must be concerned when attor-
neys are named as defendants in suits alleging breach of fiduciary
62 Klaw, Abe Pomerantz is Watching You, 77 FORTUNE, Feb., 1968, at 160.
63 J. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 50. Similarly only 72 percent of the corporate attorneys in
Carlin's sample disapproved of an attorney's purchasing stock in a corporation organized
to acquire the assets of a corporation for which he was receiver.
Edward Bloustein has challenged Carlin's conclusion about the comparative ethicality of
the corporate bar. Bloustein believes that the ethical conflict situations used in the study
did not reflect the true ethical problems of large-firm corporate practice. Consequently, he
feels that the respondents did not have to resolve their own professional problems, but
rather those of the marginal, small-firm practitioner. "We all respond 'more ethically',"
Bloustein suggests, "to other people's ethical quandaries, especially when our 'response' is
a hypothetical one." Bloustein, supra note 60, at 482.
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duty to a corporation 64 or in suits brought by federal regulatory
agencies to enforce compliance with the law.6 5 Even in cases in
which an attorney.is not named as a defendant, "we shall have to
acknowledge that ... departures from the fiduciary principle do
not usually occur without the active assistance of some member
of our profession." 66
The lack of guidance which results from the failings of the CPR
increases the possibility that corporate attorneys will lose the
independence of judgment that traditionally has been the hallmark
of the profession. The problem cannot be overlooked, because
some lawyers believe that corporate attorneys quite often are
subservient to their corporate clients. Such was Chief Justice
Stone's complaint when he spoke of the "obsequious servants of
business." 67 While the Chief Justice may have overstated his
proposition, the corporate bar continues to debate whether it is
the attorneys in large corporate law firms or those in corporate
legal departments who have most lost their independence. 68 Ba-
sically, whenever an attorney devotes a great deal of his time and
intellect to the many legal matters of any one client, he neces-
sarily develops an affinity to that entity and the persons who
operate it, and, in the absence of some external standard of
conduct, it is not unreasonable to expect that the professional role
of the lawyer might be defined in accord with the expectations of
his "client." A professional role defined in this manner, however,
may not accord with the bar's preachments about the respon-
sibilities of an attorney.
64 The boards of directors of most corporations include a lawyer. Quite often the lawyer
sitting on the board is also the corporation's attorney; for example, 50 percent of Professor
Carlin's sample were officers or directors of a client corporation. J. CARLIN, supra note 4,
at 8. Given this fact and an awareness that derivative suits often name all the directors as
defendants, one may not be surprised to see a fair number of attorney-defendants.
Such suits, particularly if successful, are an indication either that the attorney-director
had some difficulty ascertaining when the interests of the management conflicted with the
interest of the corporation or that he perceived the conflict and chose to ignore the interest
of the corporation. Although derivative suits directly involve questions of corporate law
rather than professional ethics, the legal duty of loyalty to the corporation in a general
manner parallels the mandate of Ethical Consideration No. 5 -18. Violations of the duty of
loyalty to the corporation as an entity, therefore, must concern the bar as a question of
professional ethics as well as one of corporate law.
5 Such suits are sufficiently numerous that an attorney could state that "the complaint
in the National Student Marketing case is not significant or unusual because attorneys are
named as defendants." Karmel, supra note 43, at 1156. See also Kaplan, supra note 17, at
254-56.
6 Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1934).
67 Id. at 7.
68 Corporate attorneys practicing in large law firms suggest that the danger of losing
one's professional independence is greatest for the attorney employed by one corporation.
Cf. Swaine, supra note 14, at 17 1. House counsel respond that the problem is just as acute
and perhaps more so for the large-firm corporate practitioner. Cf. Q. JOHNSTONE &. D.
HOPSON, supra note 53, at 204-05; Grahame, supra note 55, at 161.
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The possibility of externally influenced role definition is just
one aspect of a more serious problem: the failure of the profes-
sion, through the CPR, to define a professional role for the attor-
ney who practices in the corporate arena. The CPR establishes a
professional role for the solo practitioner who represents in-
dividual clients, but its inapplicability to important parts of corpo-
rate practice leaves the corporate lawyer without a meaningful
standard by which to appraise his professionalism. Because of
this, an ill defined concern about its professional identity seems to
overhang the corporate bar. The phrase "unprofessional," never
clearly defined, permeates Smigel's study of the Wall Street law-
yer. The attorney's involvement in the business affairs of his
client and his rendering business advice is considered "unprofes-
sional." 69 An associate's lack of client contact is also "unprofes-
sional." 70 The interweaving of an attorney's duty to his client with
his duty to his employer is "unprofessional." 71 Specialization is
"unprofessional.." 72 In sum, Professor Smigel's findings seem to
indicate that the corporate bar suffers from some form of identity
crisis, and one might suggest that the CPR contributes to the
problem by forcing the corporate attorney to view his professional
role in terms of a concept of the lawyer ill-fitted for modern
conditions of practice.
The failure of the profession's scheme of self-regulation in the
corporate area threatens the concept of self-regulation itself. Not
unlike the challenges to the self-regulatory functions of the stock
exchanges, challenges to the legal profession's system of
self-regulation are developing. Atihough done under the rubric of
the federal securities laws, the SEC is seeking to regulate the
conduct of attorneys representing clients subject to its jurisdic-
tion.7 3 For example, if an attorney has financial interests in a
corporation and is rendering an opinion on the legality of the
corporation's public offering of securities, the SEC requires dis-
closure of his interest. 7 4 Might they not go further, refuse to
accept opinions by financially interested attorneys, 75 and thereby
effectively reverse the profession's acceptance of stockownership
in client corporations? Escott v. Bar Chris Corporation7t 6 demon-
69 E. SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 303.
70 1 d. at 297.
71 Id. at 299.
72 Id. at 59.
73 See generally Glasser, Attorneys' Conflicts of Interest in the Investment Company
Industry, 6 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 58, 74-78 (1972).
74 Securities Act Release No. 5094 (Oct. 21, 1970).
75 Glasser, supra note 73, at 78.
76283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Bar Chris was an action under Section II of the
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strates that the SEC can regulate the conduct of attor-
ney-directors and insinuate itself into Canon 6 of the CPR and the
general questions of competent representation. Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc. 77 involved the use of Rule lOb-5 to regulate
conflicts of interest in parent-subsidiary transactions. After that
case it can be argued that Rule lOb-5 may someday replace
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B). SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corporation 78 now marks the high water mark of the SEC's effort
to define the responsibilities of attorneys in corporate practice.
Perhaps this threat to self-regulation and an awareness that SEC
regulation carries with it civil liabilities will aid the profession in
recognizing the shortcomings of the CPR.
IV. BEYOND THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Unless it is willing to abdicate its self-regulatory function, the
profession cannot conclude, as did one corporate practitioner, that
"there are... [no] ... black and white rules that we can lay down
and say this is where the duty of the lawyer lies and he should or
should not do this or that." 79 The profession must at last confront
the reality of the corporate lawyer's world and bring the issue of
the professional obligations of these lawyers to the surface for
debate, reflection, and hopefully clarification.
The development of a supplemental body of ethical norms for
the corporate setting might be considered. Edwin W. Tucker has
suggested a rethinking of the professional rules, especially those
dealing with specialization and the attorney-client relationship. 0
Another writer has suggested an amelioration of the profession's
rule against intrafirm conflicts of interest8 l In this connection
perhaps one should consider abandoning the requirement that a
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77k (1970), for material inaccuracies and omissions in
a debenture registration statement. In considering an attorney-director's defense of due
diligence under Section II, the Court held that more was required of him in terms of
reasonable investigation than could be fairly expected of another director. 283 F. Supp. at
690. The court, under Section II, essentially defined the standard of competency for an
attorney-director. The SEC might go further and attempt to impose standards of com-
petency for attorneys who are not serving on the board of directors of their client
corporation.
77322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 197 1), rev', in part, 458 F.2d 255 (3d. Cir. 1972). See
note 37 supra.
78 See note 43 supra.
79 Ballard, Mundheim, Weinstock & Wetzel, supra note 44, at 966.
80 Tucker, The Large Law Firm: Considerations Concerning the Modernization of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 344. See also Mundheim, supra note
25, at 217.
81 See Note, supra note 34.
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corporate attorney withdraw when conflicts arise and instead re-
quire that he seek an independent opinion to aid him in the
resolution of the legal question at the heart of the conflict. Tax
lawyers have felt the need to delineate the problems peculiar to
their subdiscipline of the law; 82 perhaps the securities bar and the
antitrust bar ought to do so as well.
One might also ask for a delineation of the financial, business,
property, and personal interests that, in the corporate setting, will
be presumed to affect an attorney's independent judgment.8 3 The
profession should perhaps indicate those situations in which the
interests of the executives and directors will be presumed to be
adverse to the corporate interest. It should clarify the attorney's
duties to corporate shareholders. If the bar is displeased with the
SEC position in the National Student Marketing Corp. case, it
might offer an alternative. Given the difficult position of the asso-
ciate caught between the client and the partners of his firm, and
the unsatisfactory dialogue between house counsel and the out-
side firms, rules should be devised to control these colleague
relationships as well. In general, wherever the CPR is inadequate
or silent as to the professional obligations of corporate practice,
the bar (perhaps the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law) should step in and provide the norms8 4 This is not
a novel request, but one that has been made before and ignored by
the profession.
Because the interaction between corporate lawyers and corpo-
rate clients is so complex, it may be necessary for the profession
to go beyond rule-promulgation and to seek a simplification of the
attorney-client relationship itself. Most often heard is the sugges-
82 See Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Advisor, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 412 (1953). After
examining the Canons of Professional Ethics, Mr. Paul concluded that there were few
fixed rules of behavior applicable to the tax bar and sought to demonstrate some of the
ethical problems of the tax practitioner.
83 The SEC requires disclosure if an attorney's interest in a corporation is in excess of
$10,000 or if the aggregate interests of all attorneys involved exceeds $30,000. Securities
Act Release No. 5094 (Oct. 21, 1970). The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has
ruled that an attorney may not accept employment so as to pit himself against a corpo-
ration in which members of his firm own 50 percent of the stock. ABA COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 967 (1966). Situations come readily to
mind where 10 percent of the stock is involved or where the 10 percent stock holding
constitutes 50 percent of the attorney's wealth. The Committee might also address wheth-
er an attorney or his partners may accept employment adverse to the interest of a
corporation for which he serves as a director.
84 Reiterating Professor Mundheim's admonition, the guidelines adopted
should be grounded in a realistic view of the tasks of corporate counsel and
an honest appraisal of the pressures he faces. They should only impose those
duties which one can reasonably expect real lawyers in a real world to fulfill.
They should eschew the enunication of lofty "moral" standards which most
lawyers will feel free to ignore.
Mundheim, supra note 25, at 229.
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tion that an attorney should neither sit on the board of directors
nor own stock of a client corporation.85 Such a prohibition would
eliminate the dual role of the attorney and perhaps would aid the
attorney in maintaining a buffer between himself and the conflicts
within the corporation.
Alternatively, because even attorneys who are not directors or
stockholders can be caught between conflicting directors, officers,
and stockholders, the profession might require an attorney to
represent only one interest group within the corporation. For
example, the corporate bar could define the attorney's client as
the executive officers and require the attorney to inform the other
groups having an interest in the corporation to seek separate
counsel.8 6 One can conceive of a corporation with three retained
law firms: one to represent the outside directors, one to represent
the officers, and one to represent the stockholders. One might
even advocate the retention by the corporation of an all-purpose
attorney to represent potential investors, consumers, and other
public groups interested in the conduct of the corporation. With
such a scheme of representation, the number of instances where
an attorney must serve as "counsel for the situation" would be
greatly reduced.8 7
In addition to reducing the number of conflicts present in cor-
porate practice, the profession might attempt to limit the contacts
between the law firms and the corporation in an effort to reduce
the number of personal loyalties that might otherwise develop and
complicate the attorney-client relationship. Many law firms have
one partner who is the contact with the corporate executives. 88 At
least one general counsel believes that the corporation's dealings
with outside law firms should always be through the law depart-
ment, and that there should be no direct contact between execu-
tives and the retained firm.8 9 One might similarly suggest that all
8 See Swaine, supra note 14, at 170; Brown, Ethical Problems of Corporation Counsel,
31 Wis. B. BULL., April, 1958, 25, 31; Gardner, supra note 25.
8 Many attorneys do regard their client to be the executives who retained their services
and with whom they interact. See Glasser, supra note 73, at 75; Symposium, supra note
44, at 48. The profession might do well to define the corporate attorney's client in
accordance with this understanding of the "real" corporate client, i.e., management.
87 Offsetting this benefit, however, would be the increased cost to the corporation of
legal representation and the danger of increased confusion in the corporation's deci-
sion-making process. Indeed, if carried to an extreme this scheme might increase the
conflict within the corporation. On the other hand, if the requirement of independent
counsel were.limited to a fairly well defined number of situations in which potential
conflicts of interest exist (such as mergers, dividend declarations, and executive com-
pensation), it is likely that the benefits would outweigh the costs.
18 For a discussion of the client team system of organization at many large firms, see E.
SMIGEL, supra note 3, at 225- 26.
9 Seamans, supra note 47, at 635.
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internal legal work for the law department should go through the
general counsel and not directly between executives and the staff
attorneys. Tampering with organizational structure in pursuit of
ethical clarification might, however, entail costs, such as a reduc-
tion of the organizational flexibility that has contributed to suc-
cessful representation of corporate clientele in the past. But such
possibilities should not foreclose further inquiry.
Whatever immediate steps may be taken, the profession should
rethink those roles which it sets forth as distinguishing the lawyer
from the layman and around which all the rules of the profession
revolve. It is uncertain whether the lawyer in the corporate setting
should be viewed as an advocate when more often than not he
must be a mediator. Similarly, the validity of the profession's
efforts to distinguish lawyer from businessman can be questioned
when the two roles inevitably overlap in corporate practice. The
meaning of "professional independence" should be reconsidered
when the attorney operates in a continuum of conflicting business,
financial, and personal interests that necessarily influence his con-
duct. The tenet of equality of all professional brethren should also
be reconsidered when, in the corporate setting, partners are al-
ways more equal than associates.
Basically, the profession must reconsider, in light of contempo-
rary corporate practice, the utility of the values and concepts to
which it has been so true. Having defined a professional role for
the corporate lawyer in contemporary terms, perhaps then the
profession might have better success in devising rules to assure
compliance with that role. Even if success is not forthcoming, at
least the problems confronting the modern corporate bar will have
surfaced and will have been viewed for the first time in twentieth
century terms, rather than through the tinted lens of the nine-
teenth century general solo practitioner.
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